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‘Cameras are now in places where cameras never used to be’ (Mark 
Lukasiewicz, NBC News Vice-President, 2007)2
‘almost by definition … a war waged on live television is a war 
in which political and public relations considerations become 
inextricably bound up with military tactics and strategy… how 
victory is won is almost important as victory itself’ (Washington 
Post, 24 March 2003).
On 17 January 1991, war erupted in the Middle East. As Operation 
Desert Storm began, television audiences around the world tuned into 
CNN to watch the ‘live’ coverage from a hotel in Baghdad … only they 
did not see very much at all. In fact, the opening hours of the war were 
in sound only as the three CNN reporters described the bombs falling on 
Iraq’s capital city while audiences saw only their photos superimposed on 
maps of Baghdad and Iraq. The first conflict not only of the New World 
Order but also of the ‘new’ media age, characterised by 24/7 electronic 
news gathering and live satellite broadcasting, was reported as if on 
radio (Taylor, 1992).
Ten years later, audiences were again led to believe they watched the 
horror of 9/11 unfold live on their television screens. However, it is only 
by sheer luck that we have footage of the first hijacked plane hitting the 
North Tower of the World Trade Centre (WTC) at 8:46 am local time. 
In the neighbourhood were filmmakers James Hanlon and the Naudet 
brothers making a documentary about a probationary New York fireman. 
When American Airlines Flight 11 flew by, Jules Naudet turned his 
camera to follow the plane and taped only one of three known recordings 
of the first plane hitting the WTC (the others being a video postcard by 
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Pavel Hlava filming a visit to New York to send home to family in the 
Czech republic, and a sequence of still frame CCTV photographs by 
artist Wolfgang Staehle). In this way, the biggest and most momentous 
news event of recent decades was captured and recorded by ‘accidental 
journalists’ who just happened to be in the right place at the right time.
Seventeen minutes later at 9:03 am, a second plane hit the WTC’s 
South Tower. This time, the collision was broadcast live on television, 
captured by professional camera crews circulating the burning North 
Tower in helicopters. Given the level of media literacy within Al-Qaeda, 
it is plausible that the organisers of the hijackings knew that the first 
collision would not be reported live, so delayed the second attack to 
generate media interest and coverage.
The events of 9/11 confirmed that the media, communications and 
information landscapes had changed beyond recognition, and they 
continue to change. Communications technologies develop at such a 
pace that all users, including governments, militaries and the media 
themselves, struggle to keep pace with the latest trends.3 Where once 
we could only ‘download’, we are all now encouraged to ‘upload’; just 
as soon as we got used to talking about ‘blogs’, along come ‘tweets’; 
YouTube users are now able to integrate their films with their Facebook 
accounts; and now we are learning a brand new jargon of 3G, ‘apps’ and 
‘android technology’.
These developments in the information sphere help shape both events 
and responses to them; more than at any time in the past, governments 
and militaries are learning that winning ‘hearts and minds’ must be 
central to any strategy to wage wars, or when militaries are called upon 
to engage in operations ‘other than wars’ and ‘interventions’, they know 
only too well that communication and information perception can make 
the difference between success and failure. This is particularly true in 
the so-called War on Terror which has largely been a war of ideas, and 
in which the battles for hearts and minds occur as much on our own 
doorsteps as they do in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Terrorists have long understood the importance of information, 
as they require what British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once 
called ‘the oxygen of publicity’. Media coverage of their activities, and 
especially the consequences of their actions, is perhaps their greatest 
weapon, particularly such coverage succeeds in generating fear and 
paranoia and results in state-imposed counter-measures which restrict 
civil liberties. However, the days of ‘minimum casualties, maximum 
publicity’ were swept away on 9/11 when terrorists sought maximum 
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casualties for maximum media coverage. And in creating fear, paranoia 
and the severe curtailment of civil liberties by states across the democratic 
world, Al-Qaeda’s attacks on 9/11 were doubly successful.
Long before the attacks on New York and the Pentagon, we were 
aware that terrorist networks and insurgents have adapted to this new 
information environment, and they have often acclimatised to it much 
quicker than their adversaries. Early in its life, Al-Qaeda embraced 
information as an asymmetric weapon against powerful nation-states, 
especially the US, and identified its potential for disseminating propaganda 
and recruiting new members. In fact, since 9/11 Al-Qaeda has become 
a formidable, sophisticated and prolific multi-media communications 
machine, with ready access to the As-Sahab (‘The Cloud’) Institute for 
Media Productions and its huge media library allowing the creation and 
dissemination of information and propaganda to a global audience. As-
Sahab continues to produce high quality news releases, documentary 
films and now even iPod files and videos available on mobile telephones. 
As-Sahab’s production expertise combined with Al-Qaeda’s enthusiastic 
use of the internet means the terrorists are able to converse persistently, 
securely and in multiple audiences with members, sympathisers and 
potential recruits across the world, especially among younger generations 
who may be most attracted and therefore susceptible to the message. This 
ability to communicate is essential for Al-Qaeda which is not really a 
formal organisation, but exists as a loose international network of cells 
and affiliate groups who can remain in contact with each other via the 
internet. This is demonstrated most clearly in the creation of the al-Fajr 
(‘Dawn’) Media Centre, an elaborate network of local terrorist units and 
dozens of anonymous webmasters around the world (each webmaster 
is unaware of the others’ true identities), with Al-Qaeda functioning 
as a an umbrella propaganda organisation that gives guidance to local 
movements. Computer-literate sympathisers using internet cafes, codes 
and special software to circumvent detection, to help maintain the flow 
of information through the network. Gone are the days when Al-Qaeda 
had to depend on dead-letter drops of propaganda video tapes to Al-
Jazeera and hope that the station would broadcast them; now the films 
are uploaded and distributed around the world on the internet, often 
with subtitles in English, German, Italian, Pashto, French and Turkish. 
This not only gains them a wider audience and bypasses the media, but 
should television stations so wish, they can download the films as ready-
packaged products, thus enhancing their appeal.4
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The power of information in this asymmetrical war has not been 
overlooked by political elites at the highest levels in Washington: In 2007 
US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, noted ‘It is just plain embarrassing 
that Al-Qaeda is better at communicating its message on the Internet than 
America. Speed, agility, and cultural relevance are not terms that come 
readily to mind when discussing US strategic communications’. Gates 
recalled how one US diplomat had asked him, ‘How has one man in a 
cave managed to out-communicate the world’s greatest communication 
society?’ Four years later, Washington’s political elite were still pondering 
the US’s incapacity to compete in the communications landscape: In 
March 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton admitted in testimony to 
the Senate’s Foreign Affairs Committee that ‘We are in an information 
war and we are losing that war’.
The coalition has spent ten years playing catch-up. The initial 
communications response to the terrorist information networks after 
9/11 was the creation of the Al-Hurrah (‘The Free One’) Arabic language 
television channel at a cost of $60 million per year (it is now officially 
the least watched station in the Middle East). The US also created Radio 
Free Afghanistan, Radio Farda for Iran and Radio Sawa (‘Together’), 
the latter broadcasting a diet of popular music and some news in a 
deliberate effort to target younger audiences. Yet, these stations, clearly 
created by Americans, had little or no credibility and could compete 
with neither the media the terrorists were using (the internet) nor the 
message (which identified themes which resonate with disaffected 
Muslim audiences). One former director of the Voice of America, Robert 
Reilly, was particularly scathing about such programming on US-created 
stations: ‘We do not teach civics to American teenagers by asking them 
to listen to pop music so why should we expect Arabs and Persians 
to learn about America or democracy this way? The condescension 
implicit in this nearly all-music format is not lost on the audience that we 
should wish to influence most – those who think’. Similarly Al-Hurrah 
has been criticised by US diplomat William Rugh (2005) for ‘looking 
much more like the old-style TV channels that were totally controlled 
by authoritarian governments and that served primarily as propaganda 
arms of those governments’. Whenever possible, Arab audiences will 
turn to Arab media, like Al-Jazeera, providing news and information by 
Arabs and for Arabs.
Moreover, the distinct communications culture in the Arab world 
was overlooked, most notably in Iraq: ‘In the Iraqi culture in which word 
of mouth and the messages spread by imams in the mosque were more 
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important than print or television media, the need to “get the word out 
on the street” was vital. US forces did not excel at that skill’ (Wright & 
Reese, 2010: 285). In the maelstrom of multi-media platforms and whizz-
bang communications technologies, we often lose sight of the fact that 
often the most effective form of communication and persuasion happens 
face-to-face in conversation with people; but it must be a conversation 
that demonstrates both respect for and sensitivity to the others’ interests 
and cultural context, and as a conversation it is essential that it involve 
listening as much as talking. When President Bush felt moved after 9/11 
to ask: ‘Why do they hate us’, did it occur to him to ask ‘them’?
Most problematic from a communications point of view, however, is 
not information capacity, but the credibility of the message and equally 
the credibility of the policies being sold. That message is taking its time 
getting through: Back in 2007, US Marine Corps Commander General 
Charles C. Krulak warned that every soldier had to be aware that his 
actions and behaviour could have both immediate and long-term strategic 
consequences because of the power of the ‘new’ media (Wright & Reese, 
2010: 290). While Al-Qaeda continues to develop as a sophisticated 
media organisation, its efforts have been aided by a series of clear ‘own 
goals’ by the coalition forces: the initial determination to project the War 
on Terror as a crusade, a word that resonates with particular meaning 
for Muslim audiences and underscored Al-Qaeda propaganda about 
US intentions in a ‘clash of civilisation’; soldiers distributing footballs 
made of pig leather to Muslim children; the stage management of Private 
Jessica Lynch’s rescue from an Iraqi hospital; the whole disarray over 
Saddam Hussein and Weapons of Mass Destruction; the attempt to link 
Iraq with 9/11. Wikileaks revealed how an Apache helicopter had gunned 
down civilians in Iraq, including two journalists and seriously injured 
two children in a van; while in 2011 the publication of so-called ‘trophy 
photos’ of soldiers posing with dead Iraqis continued to undermine the 
credibility of coalition operations to win ‘hearts and minds’ in much 
the same way that photos of torture and humiliation inside Abu Ghraib 
damaged US policy and presentation. Most importantly, credibility is 
not just lost in theatres of military operations; in a long war of ideas and 
perception serious damage is caused by the signals such policies send 
to unemployed, impoverished, alienated and mistreated Muslim youth 
across the world, including those in the US and UK.
A final own goal demonstrated not only the absence of consistency 
between policy and message, but also the suggestion to audiences that 
a policy was being made on an ad hoc basis with little fore-thought: In 
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2009, the ‘Small Unit Ops in Afghanistan Handbook’, published by the 
Centre for Army Lessons Learned, encouraged military leaders to use 
positive talking points about the American presence in Afghanistan when 
speaking ‘spontaneously’ with locals, including: ‘We will stay here as 
long as it takes’. Commenting on the Handbook, Walter Pincus of the 
Washington Post (2011) noted that this was ‘obviously written long before 
the 2014 date was set for the departure of US combat troops’. 
New communications technologies have likewise exercised a 
profound impact on traditional news gathering processes, especially as 
journalists enter into new and often closer relationships with their sources 
and confront the challenges of converging media platforms (Bennett, 
Lawrence & Livingston, 2007). As they become part of a new ecology in 
wartime, represented by the ‘press pools’ or the system of ‘embedding’, 
the media are forced to question their role and responsibilities, their 
ideals, norms and routines: Are they mere observers of war, or are they 
(willing or unwilling) participants in the events they record? This new 
ecology has moved the relationship between the military and journalists 
beyond that of symbiosis to one that is more complicated, with the lines 
of communications and responsibility between them increasingly blurred. 
Certainly the new information environment has made it more difficult 
than ever before for militaries to control the media. Journalists have 
become much more mobile and therefore less manageable as laptops, 
the internet and cell phones have made their job much easier. The old 
three-man news crews of the Vietnam War have been replaced by the 
lone journalist with a small satellite dish squeezed into a briefcase. The 
dilemma, however, is that this mobility has made the journalist more 
vulnerable to risk, and at the same time more willing to take risks. The 
demands of 24/7 rolling news coverage and competition from rivals 
have increased the pressures to be first with the story; and not only to 
be first with the story, but also to be the first with exciting and arresting 
visuals which will capture audience attention. It is instructive that more 
reporters have died in Iraq than in any other conflict since World War 
Two. In part this may be due to the numbers of journalists reporting the 
Iraq war: during the 2003 invasion, around 700 journalists from all over 
the world were embedded with the military; in World War Two, just 600 
journalists covered the entire South Pacific theatre of operations, and 
only 30 covered D-Day (Wright & Reese, 2010: 292). More journalists 
reporting the war in Iraq means more journalists for the military to 
protect; and it also means more journalists who have no experience of, and 
possibly no training to survive in a combat zone. According to Reporters 
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Without Borders 223 journalists and media assistants were killed 
between 2003 and 2008, compared to just 55 killed during the whole of 
the ‘unmanaged’ Vietnam War; and journalists killed in Iraq were not 
all ‘unilaterals’ who, determined to remain independent and objective, 
remained outside the military’s official media management strategies. 
Indeed, being embedded with, and therefore ‘protected’ by the military 
has not guaranteed the safety of correspondents as one third of those listed 
as killed in 2003 were actually embedded with US forces. Some, such 
as the ITN reporter Terry Lloyd, were killed by so-called ‘friendly fire’. 
We should also recall that the media have themselves become deliberate 
military targets. The calculated targeting by US missiles of Al-Jazeera 
offices, first in Kabul in 2001 and in Baghdad in 2003, killing journalist 
Tareq Ayyoub (and after the station had disclosed their location to US 
forces), raises the spectre of ‘shooting the messenger’.
In the same way that the 1991 Gulf War brought CNN to the world’s 
attention, 9/11 and its aftermath is the story of Al-Jazeera. Ten years on, it 
has evolved into a major media player with global audiences, especially 
after it launched English-language programming in 2006. Al-Jazeera 
has been criticised by the US, the UK and by various governments in 
the Middle East as ‘biased’; during the 2003 war in Iraq, even the Iraqi 
Information Minister – known in the UK as ‘Comical Ali’ because of his 
wild exaggerations about Iraq’s impending victory in the war – asked 
viewers not to believe the propaganda broadcast by Al-Jazeera. As the 
BBC has learned throughout its turbulent history with the British political 
establishment, criticisms from all sides mean that the station must be 
doing something right; and what it is doing is providing an alternative 
voice and perspective for Arab audiences about issues that are most 
relevant to them, challenging the dominance of narratives broadcast by 
CNN and the BBC. As Philip Seib has noted in his study of what he calls 
The Al Jazeera Effect (2008: 143): ‘Rather than judging the news product 
they receive according to standards prescribed by outsiders, most of Al-
Jazeera’s viewers want news that is gathered independently for Arabs by 
Arabs that see events through their eyes’. At the end of Operation Desert 
Storm in 1991, President George H.W. Bush declared, ‘By God, we’ve 
kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all’. Not only does the Vietnam 
syndrome refer to America’s technologically-superior military forces 
suffering defeat at the hands of a far less resourced guerrilla army, but 
also alludes to the prevailing belief that the media somehow contributed 
to America’s defeat in Southeast Asia.5 Yet following set-backs during 
the first battle for Fallujah in April 2004, the US military claimed ‘We 
Chap 2.indd   25 12/29/2011   10:48:23 AM
26
Journal of Media and Information Warfare
were defeated by Al-Jazeera’.6 This suggests not only the power of 
prevailing mythologies – that media, communications and presentation 
can somehow compensate for policy and operational capacity – but also 
that Al-Jazeera is a serious challenge to military strength.
Satellite broadcasting, the rise of pan-regional media organisations 
like Al-Jazeera, citizen journalism, tweets, blogs, Facebook and social 
networking have all transformed the way governments and militaries 
speak to journalists and audiences, and how publics speak to each other.7 
Many commentators have asserted that the 2011 revolutions in the Middle 
East would not have happened, nor would they have been successful in 
Egypt and Tunisia, without Facebook and other social networking sites 
(a more sober assessment of the impact of the internet is, or isn’t having 
on politics is provided by Morozov, 2011).8 Indeed Facebook has become 
a site of contestation between competing users seeking to use the new 
media for political objectives. In March 2011, a pro-Palestine group, Third 
Intifada, used Facebook to spread its message, mobilise support and call 
for a march to ‘liberate’ Palestine. The page had acquired almost half a 
million ‘fans’ before it was removed from Facebook following protests 
by the Israeli government, but it was soon replaced. Similarly, in 2007 
YouTube removed some, but not all Al-Qaeda propaganda films from 
its website, claiming that they were not all violent or engaged in ‘hate 
speech’ as Senator Joseph Lieberman, chairman of the Senate Homeland 
Security Committee, had suggested. The new information environment 
has clearly become a location not only of political mobilisation and for the 
distribution of information, but is also a new arena in which long-standing 
political and diplomatic disputes may be played out. Again, the battle for 
hearts and minds is inseparable from the policy-making process.
At the same time, Facebook and other social networking sites are also 
fora where we might test the boundaries of what is and is not permissible 
in this new ecology: What do we mean by ‘freedom of speech’? Who has 
responsibility for what is posted on the internet and the consequences of 
doing so? How is it possible to manage information in cyberspace? Who 
decides what is and is not acceptable, why and by what criteria?
Therefore the transformation of communications has been most 
pronounced in two dimensions. First, the level of interactivity has 
increased: the old style of broadcasting – ‘we speak, you listen’ – gave 
way first to niche or narrow-casting (‘we speak, you listen … if you are 
interested in the subject we are talking about’) and then to most recently 
the possibility of a more dialogical form of communication based on peer 
to peer technologies and platforms.
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The second change is a consequence of the first. The information 
environment today is far less mediated than at any time in the past, 
meaning that because of the convergence of communications tools we 
all have the opportunity to be participants in the recording of history, 
rather than experiencing it second-hand through the media. This presents 
serious challenges to militaries that are used to being able to control 
both civilians and journalists in wartime. They must now understand 
that they can no longer just pool or embed journalists to manage their 
movements and to influence what they report and how. Now when we 
talk of reporters we must also include ordinary members of the public 
with access to communications technologies that allow them to share 
information with others around the world almost instantaneously. So-
called ‘citizen journalism’ has transformed the way wars and crises are 
reported. This means the military are no longer in sole control of the 
narrative. Their command of the story and the pictures that go with it 
can be challenged on an almost minute-by-minute basis by the media, 
bloggers (both military and civilian), tweeters – in fact by anyone with 
a mobile phone, a laptop and an internet connection. Mobile phones 
with cameras, fast internet connections and information sharing sites 
like Youtube have rendered obsolete and irrelevant debates about what 
is and is not appropriate for audiences to see. Anyone wishing to see 
full coverage of Saddam Hussein’s execution in 2006 would not watch 
the BBC, CNN or even Al-Jazeera; they would go to any one of a dozen 
internet sites offering the complete and unedited film of his death.9 Then 
the publication in 2004 of a photograph of coffins draped by the Stars and 
Stripes and loaded in the back of an aeroplane on its way from Kuwait to 
the US (contravening Pentagon policy in place since 1991 which prevents 
the media from taking pictures of caskets returning home) confirmed that 
the military had lost control over the image of war.10
The challenge for political and military elites operating in this 
environment is to learn how to re-orientate the information space to 
reflect the official agenda; while militaries, audiences and the media must 
acknowledge that the convergence of communications platforms means 
that it may be very difficult to prevent Military Deception operations 
(MILDEC) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) from penetrating 
(intentionally or otherwise) media processes. In the age of new media, 
understanding and distinguishing fact from fiction, propaganda from 
information, verified from unconfirmed news is more difficult than ever 
before. Moreover, in the age of the internet, where does ‘domestic’ end 
and ‘international’ begin? Is a government sufficiently appreciative of 
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the fact that it can now speak to multiple constituencies across the world 
simultaneously, amplifying the need to make sure that all its voices 
speak with consistency? In Iraq, insurgents ‘often had a cameraman 
at the site of a car-bombing, and within minutes of the explosion, the 
images appeared on the internet without having to be vetted in any 
approval process and with little regard for the distinction between news 
and propaganda. Countering this type of instant “news” … was almost 
impossible’ (Wright & Reese, 2010: 288).
Stories circulate that the US forces themselves are prepared to 
blur reality and fiction in cyberspace, and use the internet as a method 
of disseminating ‘black’ propaganda whereby the true source of the 
message is concealed behind a false identity: Units are reported to be 
developing methods of secretly manipulating conversations on social 
media sites via ‘persona management software’. This involves military 
officers controlling up to ten separate personas – or ‘sock puppets’ as 
they are known – on social network sites in Arabic, Farsi, Pahsto and 
Urdu. These virtual personalities would be ‘replete with background, 
history, supporting details and cyber presences that are technically and 
geographically consistent’. Moreover, they would be untraceable and 
‘must be able to appear to originate in nearly any part of the world 
and can interact through conventional online services and social media 
platforms’.11 The idea is to ‘create a false consciousness in online 
conversations, crowd out unwelcome opinions and smother commentaries 
or reports that do not correspond with [US military] objectives’ (Fielding 
& Cobain, 2011). This is launched as part of Operation Earnest Voice 
(OEV) that aims to synchronise all of the US military’s Information 
Operations:
OEV seeks to disrupt recruitment and training of suicide bombers; 
deny safe havens for our adversaries; and counter extremist ideology 
and propaganda. Full funding of OEV supports all activities associated 
with degrading the enemy narrative, including web engagement … 
to counter the adversary in the cyber domain.12
In short, General David Patraeus, former commander of Central 
Command, described OEV as an attempt to ‘counter extremist ideology 
and propaganda and to ensure that credible voices in the region are 
heard’, and he claimed the aim was to be ‘first with the news’ (Fielding 
& Cobain, 2011). It is difficult to reconcile such ideals as ‘credibility’ 
and providing ‘news’ with a deliberate attempt to conceal and deceive. 
The dilemma for democracies is how and when to use non-democratic 
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methods of communications and propaganda without being tarred with 
the same brush as governments who control the media and information 
for their own political ends. There are many examples from the non-
democratic world of governments intervening in internet discussions 
to try and steer them in the desired direction. The most documented is 
the so-called ‘50-cent party’ in China, which refers to a group of young 
internet users who are paid 50-cents every time they intervene in a 
discussion on the internet and post a pro-government comment. The 
aim is to guide conversations in the ‘correct’ direction and ‘neutralise’ 
undesirable opinions. It is difficult to know where the distinctions actually 
are between the 50-Cent Party and the sock-puppets of Central Command, 
and it does make it ever harder for democracies to claim the moral high-
ground in debates with their authoritarian counterparts.
I would suggest that part of the problem is a refusal to appreciate 
how today’s communications environment in so fundamentally different 
from that of yesterday. In some ways the recognition that it is useful to 
combine both ‘old’ and ‘new’ media is encouraging, as when Hillary 
Clinton told the Senate’s Foreign Affairs Committee in March 2011, ‘… 
while we’re being active in online new media, we have to be active in 
the old media as well’ (quoted in Pincus, 2011). In parts of Afghanistan 
where illiteracy levels still reach almost 95% and where there is low 
internet penetration, it is appropriate to develop information strategies 
centred on television and radio broadcasting.
However, this demonstrates that, ten years after 9/11, we are still 
persuaded to label communications technologies as ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
media, when rather the reality is that platforms have converged. It is now 
possible to watch TV, listen to the radio and read newspapers anywhere 
in the world and from anywhere in the world, on a computer; just as 
TV news encourages its viewers to engage with them via Facebook 
and Twitter, and send them photos of news stories happening in their 
locale. Moreover, the ‘new’ media are ‘new’ only for a generation born 
before the end of the 1980s; the principal targets of information, public 
diplomacy and propaganda in the War on Terror have grown up in a 
world of Google and YouTube and have no recollections of a time before 
email and the pressure to be ‘online’ dominated our daily lives. Until this 
is recognised and the supposed dichotomy between old and new media 
disappears, progress in communication will be limited. The situation is 
certainly not helped by stories that a Crown Court judge in the UK who, 
presiding over a trial of three young Muslims accused of distributing 
propaganda over the internet in support of Al-Qaeda, confessed during 
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the proceedings: ‘The trouble is I don’t understand the language. I don’t 
really understand what a website is’.13
New communications technologies blur the traditional boundaries 
between source, producer and consumer, and this is the frontier of a 
new information space in which governments and militaries must work 
and combat their enemies. The information sphere is a battleground 
that militaries ignore today at their peril. Official communications 
must compete with an ever proliferating range of new voices, and to 
succeed, they will only do so by being credible; image and reality must 
be consistent. Moreover, believing that how you are perceived is more 
important than what you do is the biggest mistake of all. The issue is not 
about presentation. It is about policy. Perhaps any measured reflection 
on information operations ten years after 9/11 would do well to begin 
with this admission.
Postscript
‘I am JUST a tweeter, awake at the time of the crash’ 
(Sohaib Athar on realising that he had tweeted the assassination of Osama 
bin-Laden)
On Monday 2 May 2011, the world awoke again to the most extraordinary 
news, and the information war took an unexpected but important 
turn. Almost ten years after the attacks of 9/11 Osama bin-Laden 
was assassinated by elite US troops during a raid on his compound in 
Abbottabad, Pakistan. Once more, the news was first released by an 
‘accidental journalist’: an IT consultant living nearby tweeted news of 
foreign helicopters circling overhead and that one of them had crashed. 
He then awoke to news that there was a connection between what he had 
heard during the night and the death of bin-Laden: ‘Uh oh’, he tweeted, 
‘now I’m the guy who live blogged the Osama raid without knowing it’. 
However, he was not the only one to find himself acting as an ‘accidental 
journalist’ in the story. Keith Urbahan, a top aide to former defence 
secretary Donald Rumsfeld tweeted: ‘So, I’m told by a reputable person 
they have killed Osama bin Laden. Hot damn’. Thinking his ‘reputable 
person’ was Rumsfeld (it was actually a TV news producer) the tweet 
went viral. Even before President Obama made his speech announcing 
the assassination, cable news channels in the US were already reporting 
the story. The information war had entered a crucial new stage, one 
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that revolved around two priorities: (i) convincing audiences in an 
increasingly sceptical world that Osama bin-Laden really is dead; and 
(ii) seizing control of the narrative to define and control how bin-Laden 
would be remembered.
Nevertheless, this new phase in the information war was almost lost 
as soon as it had begun, as the credibility of US reports about the raid 
on bin-Laden’s compound was challenged by a series of inconsistencies 
from various sources. At first, we were told that bin-Laden had been 
armed and had put up resistance during the raid, and that he had used his 
wife as a human shield. However, the story soon changed, contradicting 
these earlier accounts of events: bin-Laden was unarmed and had not 
sheltered behind his wife. There are two important issues to consider here. 
The first is that the early information – circulating, we are told, because 
of the inevitable ‘fog of war’ – seems to have been part of a deliberate 
strategy of perception management. If bin-Laden’s followers thought 
he was unarmed and hiding behind a woman, would this turn him into 
a coward, thus undermining his warrior image? Or might it conversely 
raise questions about the legality of his death? In propaganda terms we 
might describe this decision as lose-lose for the Americans.
The second consideration is more difficult to understand given that it 
is a lesson the US should have learned a long time ago. The conflicting 
accounts seriously weakened the credibility of the narrative, and thus 
jeopardised the integrity of future information. Consistency and accuracy 
are essential in such operations, especially when talking to sceptical 
audiences who refuse to believe anything the US says.
This public scepticism is central to discussion of another decision 
taken in the week following the assassination, namely whether to publish 
photos of Osama bin-Laden’s corpse. At first, there was no question that 
indeed this would happen in time. However, President Obama decided 
that publication would be unwise because such photos would be used for 
Al-Qaeda propaganda. Besides, ‘That’s not who we are, he said. ‘We don’t 
trot out this stuff as trophies’. If Secretary Clinton is correct that the US 
is losing the information war, it is possible to argue that the photos may 
have helped to counter narratives that challenge the veracity of claims that 
bin-Laden is dead. Of course, photos would never prevent the circulation 
of conspiracy theories and discussion of alternative narratives. After all, in 
the new media age it is easier than ever to manipulate photos and convince 
audiences that ‘seeing is believing’. Nevertheless, the problem is that in 
the absence of officially-released photos as evidence – indeed without 
evidence of any kind - conspiracy theories will continue to circulate with 
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escalating credibility. This is especially the case after the swift disposal 
of bin-Laden’s body at sea. This may make it doubly difficult to verify 
the claims about his death, but this burial has clear symbolic value: it 
prevents his resting place becoming a shrine, and again allows the US 
to try to control how he will be remembered.
This strategy took a dramatic turn only one week after the 
assassination. On Saturday 7 May the US released ‘home-made videos’ of 
bin-Laden that they had found during the raid on his compound. Broadcast 
around the world and reproduced in newspapers, the footage showed the 
terrorist with an unkempt beard, wrapped in a blanket and rocking on 
the floor as he watched film of himself on television. This footage has 
clear propaganda value for it demonstrates the inconsistency between fact 
and fiction, the myth and the man. The image bin-Laden projected in the 
video messages we had seen over the past ten years was very different 
to the reality, and we ‘discovered’ that he dyed his hair and beard for 
his television appearances. The message is clear: bin-Laden was simply 
an old man, not the mythic and charismatic warrior Al-Qaeda liked to 
offer audiences. Moreover, the US released the footage without sound 
to prevent, they said, the further dissemination of his propaganda – they 
were determined not to give him the last word.
Osama bin-Laden’s assassination was a crucial part of the information 
war, and while the US mishandled it in some aspects, there is no denying 
that his death at the hands of elite Navy Seal operatives, helped the US 
regain some ground. Nevertheless, there are two further priorities that 
are perhaps the most important of all. The first is ensuring audiences 
around the world understand that the death of bin-Laden does not mean 
the end of Al-Qaeda or the war on terror. If anything, there is a stronger 
possibility of revenge attacks in the run up to the 10th anniversary of 
9/11 than before. Thus the US must now pay more attention to managing 
the perception of American audiences.
The final priority is to maintain efforts in the battle for ‘hearts 
and minds’ of young Muslims around the world and prevent their 
radicalisation. This may be difficult depending on how Al-Qaeda 
spins bin-Laden’s death in its propaganda, but most importantly it will 
depend on communicating with young Muslims and engaging them 
in conversation, rather than talking to them and trying to persuade or 
educate them. It may also mean attending to the social, economic and 
political problems that in some cases radicalise Muslims, demonstrating 
the need to think about policy as well as the presentation of policy. The 
information war continues.
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Notes
1 A version of this paper will be published in R. Utley (ed.), 9/11: Ten 
Years After (London: Ashgate, 2012)
2 Quoted in ‘Mobile Correspondents’, Washington Times, 7th January 
2007.
3 This was recognised by Ellen Goodman writing as part of the 
Washington Post Writers’ Group (9 April 1999) about the war in 
Kosovo: ‘Now the conflict in Kosovo is a chat-room war, an email 
war, a Website war, a war in which anyone with a PC and a phone line 
can quite literally become a correspondent, a war in which anyone 
with a netserver can log on to the war zone’.
4 The films no longer focus on the group’s leaders as fighters, filmed 
holding weapons outdoors or in caves. Now, Al-Qaeda’s leaders are 
often filmed at desks or in front of bookcases, and they frequently 
quote western authors to appeal to new audiences and establish their 
credibility and authority as scholars.
5 The best discussion of this is Daniel Hallin, The Uncensored War: 
The Media and Vietnam (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1992).
6 I am grateful to Dr Stephen Badsey, University of Wolverhampton, 
for this insight.
7 The first pictures of the 2005 London bombings were taken on mobile 
phones, while the first officially-‘tweeted’ crisis was the November 
2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai.
8 Reporting on Syria, the New York Times (24 April 2011) said: ‘For 
weeks now, the small number of activists, spanning the Middle East, 
Europe and the United States, have coordinated across almost every 
time zone and managed to smuggle hundreds of satellite and mobile 
phones, modems, laptops and cameras into Syria. There, compatriots 
elude surveillance with e-mailed software and upload videos on dial-
up connections.’ At the time of writing there is no evidence to support 
these claims, but if true it does demonstrate again the perceived power 
of information and the access to information technologies to shape 
events.
9 ‘Without the cell-phone video [of the execution], viewers were left 
to assume that the execution was carried out professionally. Instead 
the video revealed a chaotic scene that to many commentators 
symbolized everything that had gone wrong with the Iraq war and 
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somehow made a brutal dictator a sympathetic figure’. ‘Mobile 
Correspondents’, Washington Times, 7 January 2007.
10 Tami Silico took the photo with a digital camera and emailed it to 
her friend in the US who subsequently sent it to a local newspaper. 
Silicio was fired from her job at Kuwait International Airport, but 
not until after the photo was reproduced in media around the world 
and sparked a heated debate among politicians, four-star generals 
and journalists about the rights and wrongs of the incident.
11 This quotation is available from Wikileaks News, http://
wikileaksnews.livejournal.com/2011/02/22/, 22 February 2011
12 Commander’s Posture Statement: Statement of US Marine Corps 
General James N. Mattis, US Central Command Commander, before 
the Senate Armed Service Committee, on March 1, 2011. Available 
at http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom/posture-statement/
13 Mr Justice Openshaw at Woolwich Crown Court, May 2007. ‘He 
paid close attention as Prof Tony Sams, a computer expert, explained 
in detail how the internet works.’ ‘What’s a website, as judge at 
internet trial’, The Telegraph, 18 May 2007. One of the accused was 
allegedly the author of ‘The Encyclopedia of Hacking the Zionist 
and Crusader Websites’, distributed by the Al-Qaeda affiliated Global 
Islamic Media Front.
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